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Terra Firma as Open Seas: Interpreting Kiobel in the Failed 
State Context 
DREW F. WALDBESER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern human rights violations are often inextricably intertwined with failed 
states. Although collapsed or delegitimized countries do not have a monopoly on 
horrific violations, they certainly contribute disproportionately.1 For example, South 
Sudan, 2014’s most fragile country according to the Fund for Peace,2 is currently 
trapped in a violent civil war.3 Citizens of South Sudan have been victims of 
gruesome massacres, torture, and other war crimes.4 Militants on both sides of the 
conflict have targeted civilians.5 Further, much of the violence against civilians 
appears to have been ethnically motivated.6 Unfortunately, because of the lack of 
legitimate legal infrastructure, these victims have essentially no chance of obtaining 
justice through domestic institutions.7 As such, their best hope of obtaining any kind 
of remedy lies with the international community. For several decades, the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) has served as one of the most promising pathways for foreign plaintiffs 
to bring tort claims alleging foreign human rights violations in U.S. courts.8  
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 1. See Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN POL’Y, 
Winter 1992–93, at 3, 8, 18–20. 
 2. THE FUND FOR PEACE, FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2014, at 4 (2014), available at 
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9PEG-TJJW]. The Index ranks states based on a variety of indicators: demographic pressures, 
refugees, uneven economic development, group grievance, human flight and brain drain, 
poverty and economic decline, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, 
security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention. Id. at 10. 
 3. Id. at 16. 
 4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOUTH SUDAN’S NEW WAR 23, 81–83 (2014), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/southsudan0814_ForUpload.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B9HV-WSD5]. 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 57–61, 82; UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
SUDAN, UNITED NATIONS, CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 17 (2014), 
available at http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Portals/unmiss/Human%20Rights%20Reports
/UNMISS%20Conflict%20in%20South%20Sudan%20-%20A%20Human%20Rights%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3U8C-E3GB].  
 6. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, UNITED 
NATIONS, supra note 5, at 17.  
 7. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 86–89. 
 8. See generally BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN & 
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2d ed. 2008) (1996).  
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However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.9 has made obtaining redress for human rights violations in U.S. 
federal courts much more difficult.10 The Supreme Court originally granted certiorari 
in Kiobel to examine whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS.11 
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately held that the ATS is presumed to not apply 
extraterritorially,12 dramatically limiting potential uses of the statute to provide 
remedies for transnational human rights violations. In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court delved deeply into Congress’s intent in passing the ATS.13 The Court found 
only three settings where Congress intended the ATS to apply: “violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”14 Surprisingly, the 
Court did not explicitly rule on the original question of whether corporations can be 
held liable under the ATS.15 Rather, the majority opinion included a terse paragraph 
explaining that, in order to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial 
application, the claims must “touch and concern” the United States with “sufficient 
force.”16 
What constitutes “sufficient force” remains largely unclear. Prior to Kiobel, there 
was disagreement over whether “foreign-cubed” actions—actions arising in a foreign 
territory among two foreign parties—should be allowed. Many commentators 
believe that Kiobel was a “death knell for transnational human rights actions in U.S. 
federal courts.”17 “Foreign-cubed” actions were seemingly rejected by the Court, and 
even the efficacy of “foreign-squared” actions—where one of the parties involved is 
American or the harm occurred on U.S. soil—has been questioned by some 
commentators.18 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 10. Curtis A. Bradley, Supreme Court Holds That Alien Tort Statute Does Not Apply to 
Conduct in Foreign Countries, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.: ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/12/supreme-court-holds-alien-tort-statute-does
-not-apply-conduct-foreign [https://perma.cc/49W7-GTK2].  
 11. Anton Metlitsky, The Alien Tort Statute, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of 
Federal-Common-Law Causes of Action, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 53, 63 (2013).  
 12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 13. Id. at 1665. 
 14. Id. at 1666. 
 15. Joel Slawotsky, Are Financial Institutions Liable for Financial Crime Under the Alien 
Tort Statute?, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 960 n.10 (2013). However, at least one court has 
claimed implicit acceptance of the idea of corporate liability under the ATS exists in the Kiobel 
decision. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 16. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 17. Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 172 (2013); see also JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 196 (2013); Louise Weinberg, What We 
Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2014); Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death 
of the ATS and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:48 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-transnational
-tort-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/2ZQ3-BC73]. 
 18. See, e.g., Donald Childress, Kiobel Commentary: An ATS Answer with Many 
Questions (and the Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational Litigation), 
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This Note will ultimately argue that, despite the expansive language in Kiobel, the 
Court’s reasoning does not necessarily foreclose all “foreign-cubed” claims. Suits 
alleging human rights violations originating from conduct that took place in failed 
states avoid the concerns the Court emphasized in Kiobel. The Court should allow 
jurisdiction for human rights offenses in failed states, despite their “foreign-cubed” 
nature, because the already existing rationale for allowing jurisdiction for 
international piracy offenses is highly analogous. 
Part I of this Note explores the ATS jurisprudence leading up to and including 
Kiobel. Besides exploring the tensions and policy interests courts are grappling with, 
Part I also summarizes the various opinions in Kiobel. Part II investigates the concept 
of piracy as understood in ATS jurisprudence and argues that the concept can be 
analogized to human rights violations in failed states. Part III explains why extending 
jurisdiction to human rights claims in failed states avoids both the comity and foreign 
policy concerns the Court emphasized in Kiobel. Finally, Part IV details the strong 
interests the United States has in allowing jurisdiction in this limited context and 
discusses the efficacy of the ATS as a means of redress. 
I. THE HISTORICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT OF THE KIOBEL DECISION 
The ATS was passed in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act.19 The statute reads, in 
full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.” 20 Because the statute is so short and opaque, it presents many conceptual 
and interpretational problems.21 The lack of any specified geographical nexus for 
jurisdiction22 and the omission of any explicit causes of action are particularly 
noteworthy.23 Unfortunately, the statute’s legislative history also yields little 
clarity.24 There does not appear to be any record of congressional debates over the 
bill.25 Further, or perhaps because of the statute’s vagueness, the ATS has lain largely 
                                                                                                                 
 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel
-commentary-an-ats-answer-with-many-questions-and-the-possibility-of-a-brave-new-world
-of-transnational-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/5GPN-JCLQ]. But see Al Shimari v. CACI 
Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that Kiobel did not foreclose 
jurisdiction over claims against private military contractors from the United States by Iraqi 
nationals alleging that they were tortured while imprisoned by U.S. forces); Oona Hathaway, 
Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door
-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ [https://perma.cc/6UR2-4EUP]. 
 19. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 21. See Winkler, supra note 17, at 174–75 (citing Andrew J. Wilson, Beyond Unocal: 
Conceptual Problems in Using International Norms to Hold Transnational Corporations 
Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 43 (Olivier De Schutter ed., 2006)). 
 22. Id. at 175. 
 23. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
 24. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[N]o one seems to know 
whence [the ATS] came.”). 
 25. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
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unused for most of its lifetime. In fact, prior to the modern rebirth of the ATS in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the statute had only been invoked in three cases, 
none of which discussed the ATS or its implications in any great depth.26 These early 
cases mostly involved “piracy or war prize actions.”27  
A. The Rediscovery of the ATS 
Despite the ATS’s uneventful history, the statute blossomed into prominence with 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.28 Notably, Filartiga 
involved a “foreign-cubed” action: a Paraguayan citizen sued a Paraguayan official 
for torture that occurred in Paraguay.29 The Second Circuit’s decision emphasized 
the international community’s uniform agreement that torture violates the law of 
nations in finding that the ATS provided jurisdiction.30 As the court explained: “[F]or 
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader 
before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”31 
Filartiga introduced the ATS as a premier mechanism for providing redress for 
international human rights violations.32 Post-Filartiga, but pre-Kiobel, many courts 
had no qualms with applying the ATS extraterritorially.33 Further, in Kadic v. 
Karadzic, the Second Circuit held that the ATS could be used to bring suits against 
nonstate actors, rather than merely persons acting under color of state law.34 In short, 
the Second Circuit was leading the charge to revitalize the ATS for a new, globalizing 
world. 
                                                                                                                 
 
concurring). 
 26. See O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1908) (finding potential 
jurisdiction under the ATS, but holding that the actions being complained of had been ratified 
by the executive, congressional, and treaty-making powers, so no tort occurred); Bolchos v. 
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (finding that the statute provided jurisdiction for a 
claim involving a treaty of the United States); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. 
Pa. 1793) (holding that the statute did not apply to the suit based on an act of piracy because 
the action was not for a tort only). 
 27. Ivan Poullaos, Note, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act To 
Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 333 (2002). 
 28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 29. Id. at 878. 
 30. Id. at 881. 
 31. Id. at 890. 
 32. Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the 
Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 601, 601 (2013). 
 33. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(finding jurisdiction existed for a claim brought by Liberian plaintiffs against a U.S. company 
for hazardous child labor which the company utilized in Liberia); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding jurisdiction existed for a claim brought by Indonesian 
plaintiffs against a U.S. company for conduct which occurred in Indonesia); Kadic v. Karadzic, 
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding jurisdiction existed for a claim brought by Bosnian 
plaintiffs against a Bosnian defendant for a genocidal campaign allegedly carried out in 
Bosnia).  
 34. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
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In Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, the Supreme Court addressed the ATS’s 
renaissance.35 Sosa involved an action brought partially under the ATS by a plaintiff 
alleging that U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents hired Mexican nationals 
to kidnap the plaintiff and bring him to the United States where he could be arrested 
and tried for crimes.36 In attempting to make sense of the newly popularized ATS, 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion explained that there were three recognized 
violations of the law of nations at the time the ATS was passed: “violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”37 The Court 
rejected the idea that the ATS was passed without having an enforceable purpose, 
but reasoned that the purpose appeared to be limited to the three aforementioned 
violations of the law of nations.38 In short, the majority held that “courts should 
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”39  
The Sosa majority also addressed the foreign policy implications of adopting an 
unrestrained interpretation of the ATS, foreshadowing a prominent theme in Kiobel. 
The opinion emphasized the Court’s wariness to open the door for federal courts to 
“consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of 
foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government 
or its agent has transgressed those limits.”40 In short, Sosa limited the potential 
universe of ATS claims, but clearly left the door open for suits brought alleging 
human rights violations that were sufficiently analogous to the historical violations 
of the law of nations.  
After Sosa, courts and commentators were left to debate which, if any, modern 
day human rights violations were sufficiently specific and subject to universal 
condemnation to fall under the ATS. Of the three original contexts for the ATS’s 
application the Court mentioned, piracy is the most comparable to modern human 
rights concerns.41 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Sosa reflected this 
understanding by implying that piracy represents the benchmark for modern 
applications of the ATS.42  
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 36. Id. at 697–98. 
 37. Id. at 715. 
 38. Id. at 719–20. 
 39. Id. at 725. The Court further held that the requirements of universality and specificity 
were not met in the case before them. Id. The Court also took care to clarify that universality 
and specificity were not necessarily the only requirements. Id. at 732–33. One other potential 
limiting principle the Court highlighted was exhaustion: a requirement that the claimant had 
exhausted all available remedies in the domestic court system. Id. at 733 n.21. 
 40. Id. at 727. 
 41. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals 
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 132 (2004). 
Additionally, the Sosa opinion cited two piracy cases as historical examples of ATS 
application. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. Previous ATS cases were almost entirely focused on piracy 
or war prize actions. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.  
 42. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760–62 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s obvious desire in Sosa to contain the ATS, the 
decision also seems to manifest an understanding that the growing consensus in the 
international community over the wrongfulness of certain actions deserves, if 
nothing else, attention.43 Considering the growth and development of the modern 
conception of human rights over the past few decades, perhaps this is unsurprising.44 
As globalization draws the world together and transforms the way that human rights 
are perceived and articulated, the international community’s collaboration becomes 
increasingly integral to addressing violations.45  
B. The Supreme Court Reexamines the ATS in Kiobel 
If Filartiga46 marked the beginning of a new age of ATS litigation, Kiobel47 seems 
to represent a dramatic shift in the treatment of the ATS. In retrospect, perhaps the 
change in course was predictable. The Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd.48 was openly hostile to extraterritorial claims, albeit in the 
antitrust context.49 Two years later, in 2012, Kiobel arrived at the Supreme Court. 
Like Filartiga, Kiobel involved a “foreign-cubed” case. The plaintiffs in Kiobel were 
Nigerian citizens who alleged that the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company had aided 
Nigerian officials in conducting a reign of terror against individuals protesting the 
environmental consequences of the defendant’s oil production activities.50 Initially, 
the Supreme Court heard arguments on whether corporations could be held liable 
under the ATS.51 However, the Court immediately requested additional briefing and 
argument on the issue of whether the ATS should grant jurisdiction for torts arising 
from conduct which occurred in foreign nations.52 In its eventual decision, the Court 
held that the ATS was subject to a presumption against extraterritorial application 
and that the presumption had not been overcome in the present case.53 Although the 
justices disagreed about the specific reasoning, all agreed on the ultimate outcome.54  
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. See id. at 729–30, 732–38. 
 44. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY, 179–80 (2010). 
 45. See Allison Brysk, Introduction to GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2–4 
(Allison Brysk ed., 2002).  
 46. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 47. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
 48. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 49. In Morrison, the Court refused to allow foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign and American 
defendants for alleged misconduct involving misrepresentations made about the value of 
certain mortgage-servicing rights. Id. at 251–52. The Court emphasized that a federal antitrust 
statute should be presumed not to apply extraterritorially and rejected the Second Circuit’s 
more liberal test for application of the statute. Id. at 255, 261. Rather, the Court reasoned, 
because the security involved was not listed on an American stock exchange, and all aspects 
of the purchases occurred outside the United States, the statute did not apply. Id. at 273.  
 50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662. 
 51. Winkler, supra note 17, at 183. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 54. Id. at 1669–70. 
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Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion.55 The opinion quoted Morrison’s 
language to establish that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”56 The presumption was justified as a means 
to avoid international discord stemming from foreign policy complications that 
extraterritorial application might create.57 The opinion referenced Sosa repeatedly to 
support the idea that applications of the ATS must be constrained so as to limit 
infringement on foreign policy decisions made by the other branches.58 According to 
Roberts, the “danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy” is “all the more pressing when the question is whether a cause of action under 
the ATS reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign.”59  
After establishing the presumption’s existence, Roberts’s opinion focused on 
whether the “text, history, and purposes of the ATS” provide a clear indication of 
extraterritoriality.60 Here, Roberts followed the Sosa Court in pointing out the three 
principal offenses against the law of nations that existed at the passage of the ATS.61 
The Chief Justice argued that violations of safe conducts and infringements on the 
rights of ambassadors are not necessarily extraterritorial offenses and thus provide 
no basis to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.62  
Piracy, however, is the classic example of a nonterritorial offense. Roberts 
recognized this, even admitting that the high seas are generally treated the same as 
foreign jurisdictions when applying a presumption against extraterritorial 
application.63 However, he distinguished piracy from other extraterritorial conduct 
by explaining that allowing jurisdiction for piracy “does not typically impose the 
sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy 
consequences.”64 Because pirates operated outside of recognized jurisdictions, they 
were fair game for every nation and, perhaps, a sui generis category for jurisdictional 
purposes.65 After emphasizing that the ATS was passed to avoid diplomatic strife,66 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. Id. at 1662. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. As outlined below, 
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurrence, 
joined by Justice Thomas, explaining that he would have gone even further than the Court’s 
opinion: bar ATS actions unless the “domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international 
law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized 
nations.” Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 56. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1664–65. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1665. 
 61. Id. at 1666. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 1667. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. Indeed, Justice Roberts is not alone in believing that piracy is afforded universal 
jurisdiction for unique reasons. See Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 153–56. 
 66. Apparently, prior to the ATS’s passage, there was a controversy involving a French 
official who was insulted and physically threatened by another French citizen in Philadelphia. 
Although it appears the offender was brought to justice, the French official requested that 
Congress pass a statute protecting the rights of foreign officials on U.S. soil. See Curtis A. 
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Roberts asserted that providing a cause of action for conduct occurring in another 
sovereign’s territory would generate exactly that kind of strife.67 
The opinion’s concluding paragraph is terse and indeterminate. After reminding 
the reader that all the conduct alleged in the case was foreign, Roberts asserted that 
“where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do 
so with sufficient force” to rebut the presumption.68 Other than holding that “mere 
corporate presence” is not enough,69 the opinion provides no other explanation for 
when, if ever, the presumption would be rebutted. 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy attempted to downplay the scope of the 
Court’s decision and the reach of its reasoning.70 After recognizing that “a number 
of significant questions” remain unanswered, Kennedy hints that the application of 
the presumption against extraterritorial application might be different in cases 
involving serious violations of international law principles not covered by the 
“reasoning and holding of [the] case.”71 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence provides a broader, more nuanced perspective on 
how the presumption against extraterritoriality might be rebutted.72 Rather than 
creating a presumption against extraterritorial application, Breyer would find 
jurisdiction when 
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an 
American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that 
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming 
a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or 
other common enemy of mankind.73 
Breyer framed his concurrence around the Court’s rationale in Sosa. First, he 
reiterated the Sosa Court’s finding that only claims alleging violations of 
international norms of universal acceptance and specificity equivalent to the three 
original violations of the law of nations could be brought under the ATS.74 Then, 
presumably in response to Roberts’s clear concern about disrupting foreign policy 
and comity, Breyer contended that additional requirements of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies and respect for the sovereign rights of other nations might apply.75 
According to Breyer, however, the real question guiding application of the ATS 
is: “Who are today’s pirates?”76 He argued that the Court’s opinion was premised on 
the belief that Congress normally legislates regarding domestic matters, but asserted 
                                                                                                                 
 
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 638–41 (2002) (arguing, 
however, that this incident was not the “genesis of the Alien Tort Statute”).  
 67. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–69. 
 68. Id. at 1669. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. 
 72. The concurrence was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
 73. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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that the ATS was enacted with foreign conduct in mind—specifically, piracy.77 
Breyer challenged Roberts’s attempt to distinguish piracy from modern human rights 
violations by pointing out that, despite piracy’s nexus to the high seas, international 
law treats ships like small, sovereign slices of their homeland.78 In other words, 
piracy prosecutions did involve applying U.S. law to conduct occurring within the 
sovereign jurisdiction of another state. Further, although Roberts claimed that 
allowing jurisdiction for piracy resulted in less danger of interfering with U.S. 
foreign policy than allowing jurisdiction for conduct occurring on land, Breyer gave 
several examples of piracy’s impact on foreign relations.79 In answer to his own 
question, Breyer concludes that “today’s pirates include torturers and perpetrators of 
genocide. And today, like the pirates of old, they are ‘fair game’ where they are 
found.”80 
C. Reconciling Kiobel with Sosa, Filartiga, and the Modern, Globalizing World 
The Kiobel decision leaves much unresolved.81 It uses sweeping language in 
creating a presumption against application of the ATS that will undoubtedly bar 
claims in many, if not most, circumstances. However, the decision is perhaps more 
interesting for what it leaves unaddressed. First, the decision completely ignores the 
original issue on appeal—whether corporations are subject to liability under the ATS.82 
Further, the barebones “touch and concern” paragraph gives little indication of whether 
suits involving either domestic conduct or one domestic party—the aforementioned 
“foreign-squared” suits83—might still be valid. Seemingly, Kiobel does not mean that 
all extraterritorial claims are barred as a matter of course—Justices Alito and Thomas 
alone appeared to suggest that interpretation in their concurrence.84 Justice Breyer’s 
three-pronged approach85 would seem to encompass some extraterritorial actions, 
and several commentators have made persuasive arguments for the inclusion of 
“foreign-squared” ATS actions.86 This Note will argue that the United States has a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. Id. at 1672 (“[A]t least one of the three kinds of activities that we found to fall within 
the statute’s scope, namely piracy, normally takes place abroad.” (citation omitted)). 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. Specifically, Breyer mentioned the “Barbary Pirates, the War of 1812, the sinking 
of the Lusitania, and the Lockerbie bombing.” Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch 
and Concern” the United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695, 
1703–04 (2014) (noting that the decision failed to offer “conclusive guidance” for cases 
involving, for example, “U.S. nationals as defendants, conduct within the jurisdiction or 
control of the United States or performed under contract with the U.S. government”). 
 82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring); Steinhardt, supra note 81, 
at 1705. 
 85. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme 
Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014); Winkler, supra note 17, at 
187–88; Alex S. Moe, Note, A Test by Any Other Name: The Influence of Justice Breyer's 
Concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 286–87 (2014).  
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strong enough interest in allowing jurisdiction for claims arising in failed state 
contexts to overcome the Court’s wariness in Kiobel. 
Secondly, the Kiobel decision does not explicitly discuss Sosa’s or Filartiga’s 
continued vitality. Roberts’s87 and Breyer’s88 opinions in Kiobel both cite Sosa 
approvingly. Alito’s opinion would have applied the Sosa test only to domestic 
conduct.89 However, the refusal of the other seven Justices to adopt the rationale 
advanced by Justices Alito and Thomas is telling—the obvious implication is that 
some foreign cases would be acceptable.90 Because this issue was not directly 
addressed by any of the opinions, drawing definite conclusions is risky. However, at 
the very least, it is possible to read the “touch and concern” language as 
encompassing both Sosa and Filartiga.91 Despite the “foreign-cubed” fact patterns 
in both cases, they arguably “touched and concerned” the United States to a sufficient 
extent for jurisdiction.92 Finally, the “touch and concern” paragraph can, and perhaps 
should, be read as dicta. Kennedy’s concurrence—representing the crucial fifth vote 
for Roberts’s opinion—was careful to emphasize the narrow holding of Kiobel and 
the possibility of different outcomes under other circumstances.93 Despite the 
majority opinion’s sweeping language, there is ultimately little substance to guide 
future applications of the ATS. Certainly, the presumption against extraterritoriality 
and comity and foreign policy concerns highlighted by the Court will control in 
future cases. However, as this Note will explore in the next several Parts, that 
presumption and those concerns should be rebutted in certain circumstances. 
Finally, the reasoning in all four opinions issued by the Kiobel Court framed the 
issue around conceptions of sovereignty and territoriality, ideas which increasingly 
carry different meaning and relevance than they did even as little as fifty years ago.94 
Creative thinking is necessary to navigate this new world—one simultaneously made 
smaller yet more complex by globalization.95 The world can no longer be 
conceptualized as an intricate puzzle filled with interlocking jurisdictions.96 Rather, 
transnational problems, relationships, and solutions are multifaceted, requiring 
different levels and varieties of legal actors to work together. Trusting in the 
traditional nation-state system to resolve the challenges posed by the globalizing 
world, as the Court in Kiobel appeared to do, is problematic. Parts III and IV of this 
Note will point out the inadequacy of traditional foreign policy and comity 
approaches when applied to the failed-state context, thus demonstrating the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–65. 
 88. See id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 90. Steinhardt, supra note 81, at 1705. 
 91. Cassel, supra note 86, at 1784. 
 92. Id. Of course, jurisdiction was ultimately not found in Sosa, but that holding was 
based on the lack of universality and specificity of the claim, not extraterritorial application. 
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. See also Cassel, supra note 86, at 1787. 
 94. See Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 
MOD. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005).  
 95. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Hinskey Hills Lectures, Sailing to Globantium, 3–4 (Spring 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).  
 96. Id. 
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inapplicability of the Kiobel Court’s primary concerns that led to applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.97 
II. ANALOGIZING PIRACY TO MODERN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS  
IN FAILED STATES 
There was a basic consensus among the Justices in Kiobel that piracy was 
originally, and remains, a proper context for the application of the ATS. The Court’s 
treatment of piracy in Kiobel was largely superficial—acknowledging that piracy 
was a recognized violation of the law of nations at the time the ATS was passed. But 
piracy was the only universal jurisdiction crime recognized by common law and the 
law of nations.98 Exploring why, exactly, piracy was treated differently than other 
kinds of crimes in the eighteenth century will provide context and guidance for 
situations where the newly created presumption against extraterritorial application 
should be rebutted. Specifically, the harms and jurisdictional problems caused by 
human rights violations in failed states bear many similarities to those caused by 
piracy. 
A. Piracy as Understood at the Time of the ATS’s Passage 
There was universal jurisdiction over piracy under the early law of nations.99 
Although piracy’s heinous, universally condemned nature is the reason commonly 
given for universal jurisdiction,100 a better explanation focuses on the characteristics 
and impact of the activity.101 Piracy receives universal jurisdiction and condemnation 
because of “its otherwise jurisdictionless nature, its threat to international commerce, 
and the difficulty of policing it.”102 Professor Kontorovich has offered a nuanced 
perspective on why piracy attained universal jurisdiction status, identifying six 
characteristics of piracy that would need to be met for ATS jurisdiction to exist in 
other contexts.103  
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Although exploring them is beyond the scope of this Note, the basic disconnect 
between the state-centric, top-down sovereignty rationale in Kiobel and the rapidly changing 
world is applicable to many other contexts as well, including antitrust efforts and labor rights.  
 98. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 114. 
 99. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.  
 100. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 185–86 (2004). 
 101. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 138. If heinousness is the only requirement, then a 
potentially unlimited number of crimes could be subject to universal jurisdiction. Further, it is 
unclear that piracy is really that heinous. Is “robbery at sea,” as piracy has been described, 
more heinous than a garden-variety murder in Chicago? See Kontorovich, supra note 100, at 
191, 205–07. Heinousness, of course, is certainly not a reason to disallow jurisdiction—it is 
just not a sufficient reason by itself. 
 102. Recent Case, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2014) (citing United States v. Ali, 718 
F.3d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
 103. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 114–15.  
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First, piracy was universally condemned by all nations.104 This requirement, also 
made explicit in Sosa,105 is the most commonly identified. Second, piracy was 
narrowly defined.106 This requirement was also read into ATS jurisprudence in Sosa, 
articulated there as “specificity.”107 Third, piracy occurred on the high seas, outside 
traditional jurisdictional nexuses.108 The limitations of traditional jurisdictional 
constructs necessitate universal jurisdiction.109 Traditional jurisdiction’s inadequacy 
is not necessarily limited to the high seas. For example, in United States v. Ali, the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed universal jurisdiction over piracy when the 
defendant’s alleged actions were “limited to acts he committed on land and in 
territorial waters—not upon the high seas.”110 Notably, Ali was decided post-Kiobel. 
Fourth, pirates were private actors—their actions did not represent official decisions 
by a sovereign nation.111 Because official action is political action, providing 
universal jurisdiction only for pirates acting privately avoided foreign policy and 
comity concerns.112 Fifth, pirates were a global externality, posing an economic and 
security threat to many nations.113 Piracy threatened international commerce and 
navigation, things which all seafaring nations had a vested interest in protecting.114 
Finally, piracy was subject to the same punishment in all jurisdictions—death.115 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. Id. at 139. 
 105. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 732 (2004). 
 106. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 139–40. 
 107. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 108. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 152. 
 109. Id. at 152–53; see also United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“Such vessels are ‘international pariahs.’ By attempting to shrug the yoke of any nation’s 
authority, they subject themselves to the jurisdiction of all nations ‘solely as a consequence of 
the vessel’s status as stateless.’” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 1982))). 
 110. 718 F.3d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The defendant was being charged criminally 
under a theory of aiding and abetting piracy, but the court still found that it would be 
“self-defeating” to limit liability to conduct occurring on the high seas. Id. at 940. As the court 
explained, the “high seas language refers to the very feature of piracy that makes it such a 
threat: that it exists outside the reach of any territorial authority, rendering it both notoriously 
difficult to police and inimical to international commerce.” Id.  
 111. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 145–51. 
 112. See id. at 146–47. 
 113. Id. at 152–53. 
 114. Id. at 153. 
 115. Id. at 142–46. The key concerns here are forum shopping and double-jeopardy. Id. at 
143. However, piracy is still a universal jurisdiction offense, yet there is no longer uniformity 
in penalties for piracy. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An 
Empirical Study of National Prosecution of International Crime (Northwestern University 
School of Law, Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 211, 2012), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context
=facultyworkingpapers [https://perma.cc/P5JB-D5SU]. Thus, this characteristic seems an 
inapposite requirement for modern applications of the ATS. 
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B. Human Rights Violations in Failed States Create the Same Concerns as Piracy 
In Kiobel, the Court made clear that the heinous nature of human rights violations, 
when committed outside of the United States, does not ordinarily and by itself justify 
jurisdiction.116 However, when the reasons for providing universal jurisdiction over 
piracy are compared to those present in the failed state context,117 the similarities are 
sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. 
First, the two requirements for jurisdiction articulated in Sosa do not necessarily 
bar claims originating in failed states. Although Sosa’s requirements of universal 
condemnation and specificity weeded out some ATS claims, many were still brought 
and found to be within the federal courts’ jurisdiction.118 Further, failed states are 
particularly susceptible to human rights violations, especially egregious violations 
that would meet the Sosa requirements.119  
Like pirate vessels, failed states do not fit naturally into normal conceptions of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. Unlike a strong, fully functioning state, failed states 
cannot exercise sovereign power over their territory.120 The government’s legitimacy 
is minimal, infrastructure is failing, and conflict is constant.121 South Sudan has been 
consumed by civil war since December 2013.122 The conflict has ravaged 
infrastructure, and the government has failed to demonstrate either the capacity or 
the desire to protect its vulnerable citizens.123 Such states lack the ability to honor 
international obligations or even engage in diplomatic relations with other states in a 
coherent way.124 Thus, the failed state can be described as a mere “international legal 
person without any substance to back its claim to statehood.”125 Like the high seas, 
the territory which the failed state nominally controls is a jurisdictional dead zone. 
Although, speaking in technical terms, that territory might still represent a legal 
entity, the territory does not remain a legal jurisdiction for practical purposes. 
Legitimate litigation or lawmaking from within is unfeasible. Piracy prosecutions 
have no jurisdictional barriers because no single authority can police the high seas. 
This same problem exists in failed states. Thus, as with piracy, the realities of the 
situation necessitate universal jurisdiction. 
Further, neither failed states nor piracy involves a legitimate actor making official 
decisions. Rather, failed states involve the collapse of a government. Nonstate actors 
dominate the territory because the government is no longer capable of offering 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663–65 (2013). 
 117. See infra notes 144–50 and accompanying text for a definition of failed state. 
 118. Steinhardt, supra note 81, at 1700.  
 119. See generally Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, 46 
J. OF PEACE RES. 163 (2009). 
 120. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 100 (2011). 
 121. Id.  
 122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015, 495 (2015), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2015_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FCM-JQJ6]. 
 123. Id. at 500. 
 124. GM Ferreira, Good Governance and the Failed State, 41 COMP. & INT’L L.J. OF S. 
AFR., 428, 435–36 (2008). 
 125. Id. at 436. 
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protection.126 Self-proclaimed warlords, former government officials, and petty 
criminals all prey on the population.127 For example, South Sudan is currently torn 
between two ethnic factions, one supporting South Sudan’s president, and the other 
supporting a former deputy of his.128 As with piracy, human rights violations in failed 
states involve rogue actors preying on victims of opportunity. Further, providing 
jurisdiction in the failed state context would largely avoid the foreign policy and 
comity concerns on which the Kiobel Court was so fixated.129 Because the violations 
do not involve official action by a sovereign state, the potential for political 
embarrassment or controversy when providing jurisdiction to hear ATS claims is 
greatly reduced.  
Finally, the costs and harms imposed by human rights violations in failed states 
impact many nations—they are a global externality. First, failed states are breeding 
grounds for terrorist organizations, human trafficking, and smuggling of all 
varieties.130 Each of those activities has a clear and direct impact on the greater 
international community. Unchecked human rights abuses also result in floods of 
refugees to surrounding states.131 Since the beginning of South Sudan’s civil war, 
over 500,000 refugees have fled the country.132 Within South Sudan, another 1.5 
million individuals have been displaced.133 Additionally, internal conflict and 
lawlessness in a failed state can destabilize the surrounding region—violent radicals 
might spread from the collapsed state to other states, ethnic conflict might draw in 
related ethnic groups in other states, or surrounding states might feel the need to 
increase their armament.134 Further, the developed community occasionally feels 
morally compelled to intervene in areas where massive, sustained human rights 
violations have proceeded unchecked.135 As already established, failed states are 
exceedingly likely to serve as the backdrop for this kind of conduct.136 Surely, then, 
the international community has an interest in providing redress for these claims 
without needing to actually put humanitarian forces on the ground. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, failed states—and especially those failed states gripped 
by violence—impose significant economic costs on neighboring states.137 Just like 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 5–6 (Robert I. 
Rotberg ed., 2003). 
 127. Id.  
 128. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122, at 495. 
 129. See infra Part III.  
 130. Yoo, supra note 120, at 107. 
 131. Id.  
 132. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., SOUTH SUDAN – CRISIS: FACT SHEET #5 (2015), 
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 133. Id.  
 134. Yoo, supra note 120, at 107–08. 
 135. Wayne Sandholtz, Humanitarian Intervention, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 201, 211–12. 
 136. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 137. Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Cost of Failing States and the Limits 
to Sovereignty (United Nations Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Research Paper 
No. 2007/30, 2007), available at http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17
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piracy imposed significant economic and security costs on all seafaring nations, 
human rights violations in failed states are a global externality.138  
  In summary, the same reasons for creating universal jurisdiction for piracy 
apply to human rights violations in failed states. The ATS provides jurisdiction for 
piracy not only because of the heinousness of the crime, but more importantly 
because the conduct cannot be adequately deterred otherwise. All nations have a 
vested interest in stopping the conduct, but no one nation can do so alone. Likewise, 
human rights abuses in failed states—at least those that are specific and heinous 
enough to receive universal condemnation—cannot be rectified by reliance on 
traditional jurisdictional concepts. The cost of these violations, both for the victims 
and the international community, is extremely high. Further, by definition, these 
abuses occur in a place where effective, legitimate governance is no longer occurring. 
The failed states cannot be expected to provide adequate redress. Thus, conduct 
occurring in failed states is one circumstance where the Kiobel presumption against 
extraterritorial application should be rebutted. 
III. PROVIDING JURISDICTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES IN FAILED STATES 
AVOIDS THE COMITY AND FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS THE COURT  
EMPHASIZED IN KIOBEL 
Although the majority in Kiobel attempted to distinguish piracy from modern 
human rights offenses, the majority’s reasoning in doing so was focused more on the 
foreign policy and state sovereignty implications of providing jurisdiction for 
extraterritorial conduct under the ATS.139 Certainly, unfettered ATS jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 
/diw_01.c.346922.de/chauvet_conflict_gecc.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K7X-6KKE] (estimating 
that the annual cost to neighbors of failed states is approximately $237 billion). 
 138. In this context, a failed state can be conceptualized as a kind of “commons”: like the 
public field which offers potentially free grazing, the failed state offers potential for increased 
economic growth and security for other states. See infra Subpart IV.A (detailing potential 
benefits to the global order, and the United States specifically, which intervention in failed 
states could produce). The analogy extends further: a “tragedy of the commons” occurs when 
the self-interested ranchers overgraze the public field and destroy it; similarly, self-interested 
states want to reinforce and comply with sovereignty norms because those norms usually help 
produce political stability and economic growth, the same public goods the international 
community wants from the failed state. However, refusal to intervene in the failed state only 
exacerbates the economic and political externalities imposed by failed states. See infra text 
accompanying notes 186–96 for a discussion of these externalities. In this way, the 
international community’s blind reliance on sovereignty norms actually produces the opposite 
effect as intended: instead of undergirding the economic and political order, it undermines it. 
Thus, a “tragedy of the commons,” in a sense, occurs: the self-interested actions (or, here, 
inaction) of the potential beneficiaries results in the loss of those potential benefits. However, 
when some attempt is made to govern the commons, like extending ATS jurisdiction, the 
international community will benefit, despite the potential weakening of sovereignty norms. 
See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243, 1244–45 (1968). 
 139. See supra Part I.B.  
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could result in awkward diplomatic situations.140 Expanding ATS jurisdiction could 
create a precedent whereby U.S. citizens and officials were sued in foreign courts, 
perhaps to make a political point.141 More specifically, the Supreme Court was 
concerned with comity—a rule of construction that “cautions courts to assume that 
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations” so as 
to ensure harmony between “potentially conflicting laws.”142 However, as will be 
demonstrated, the implications and dangers of expanding ATS jurisdiction in the 
failed state context are limited.  
To this point, this Note has discussed common characteristics of failed states and 
piracy.143 However, if the deciding factor for whether ATS jurisdiction exists is to be 
whether the conduct occurred in a failed state, a working definition of what a failed 
state is must be advanced.144 Because the Kiobel Court focused on traditional 
concepts of comity, sovereignty, and foreign relations, the ability of a state to fulfill 
those traditional state functions is most relevant.145 First, the state’s government must 
be incapable of fulfilling its international obligations.146 Even though the state might 
still technically exist as a legal entity, it must lack the ability to operate as a 
nation-state in the international community.147 Second, the state must be unable to 
ensure access to basic public services like public order, civil liberties, and, especially, 
an impartial, functioning legal system.148 Of course, if the state is itself complicit in 
the ongoing human rights violations, then it cannot provide a fair justice system.149 
Finally, the state must have lost legitimacy domestically—whether from lack of 
representativeness in the government, other groups claiming authority to govern, 
corruption, or simple ineffectiveness.150  
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Cassel, supra note 86, at 1790. 
 141. Id. at 1791. 
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 143. See supra Part II. 
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and “Human Rights and Rule of Law” categories). 
 149. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1495 (“Our own basic civil rights law proceeds on the 
theory that courts at the place of a governmental violation of human rights are not trustworthy 
enforcers of the human rights of their own residents.”). 
 150. See THE FUND FOR PEACE, supra note 2, at 10 (encompassed in the “State Legitimacy” 
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This working definition of a failed state provides an opportunity to determine 
whether extending ATS jurisdiction to conduct originating in such states would 
implicate the comity and foreign policy concerns identified by the Kiobel Court. The 
next two subparts demonstrate that extending ATS jurisdiction in this limited context 
would avoid the problems feared by the Court. 
A. Comity and Failed States 
When dealing with a failed state, comity is an inappropriate consideration. Failed 
states, by definition, do not possess sovereign interests in the sense that a strong, 
functional state does.151 Further, failed states are unable to provide adequate legal 
remedies for domestic human rights violations. Thus, extending jurisdiction for 
abuses occurring in failed states not only avoids comity concerns, but also is 
necessary for any suitable remedy to occur. 
The Court’s emphasis on the need for comity stems from its adherence to 
traditional norms of sovereignty—the nation-state as a self-sufficient, autonomous 
whole.152 There is serious debate over whether that conception of the world is, or 
ever has been, truly accurate, especially once globalization’s impact is considered.153 
And sovereignty does not exist in failed states.154 Failed states have, at best, a barely 
functioning state apparatus.155 There is no central authority and the government, if 
one still exists, has no monopoly on the legitimate use of force.156 Further, 
lawmaking, if it occurs at all, is done by fiat, with scarcely a pretense of legitimate 
procedure.157 Thus, allowing jurisdiction under the ATS would not undermine the 
principle of comity—the failed state does not possess the institutional coherence or 
legitimacy to meet traditional conceptions of sovereignty.  
Additionally, the international community will occasionally intervene in failed 
states to “halt large-scale human rights abuses.”158 When armed intervention occurs 
in a failed state, the “sensitive sovereignty issue” is skirted, at least partially.159 As 
Professor Sandholtz asserts, “In the post-Cold War era, there is an emerging sense 
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135, at 221 (“Governments are able at least partially to skirt the sensitive sovereignty issue in 
cases where intervention was carried out in states without a functioning government in control 
of its territory . . . .”). 
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 157. See Rotberg, supra note 126, at 6–7. 
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 159. Id. at 221. 
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that when states engage in gross, systematic, or large-scale human rights abuses, they 
thereby forfeit or suspend their status as sovereign equals in interstate society.”160 
Surely, if failed states are lacking in sovereignty enough to justify actual 
on-the-ground intervention, then allowing ATS jurisdiction would not violate 
comity. Allowing private actors to bring civil actions in U.S. courts would appear to 
be cheaper and potentially more effective than physical intervention.161 
Secondly, failed states do not possess the means to provide legitimate domestic 
legal remedies. In cases involving extraterritorial conduct, judges commonly wonder 
why the case is not being brought where the cause of action originated.162 However, 
obtaining legal redress in a failed state is not possible. When the local government 
has lost its monopoly on the use of force and governmental institutions are corrupt 
and grossly dysfunctional,163 the legal system, insofar as it exists, is completely 
illegitimate.164 Often, ATS plaintiffs will have attempted to bring domestic claims 
but cannot receive a fair hearing. In fact, this occurred in Filartiga.165 In other words, 
victims in failed states that file a claim in the jurisdiction where the cause of action 
originated do not have any real expectation of justice. 
  Further, the principle of exhaustion could serve as a limiting principle, 
ensuring that ATS suits could not be brought by those who have an adequate 
domestic legal remedy. The Sosa Court referenced this idea in a footnote.166 In 
addition to the two explicit requirements the Court created for ATS jurisdiction,167 
plaintiffs might also be required to show they “exhausted any remedies available in 
the domestic legal system.”168 Beyond that open-ended footnote in Sosa, the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the exhaustion issue in the ATS context. However, a number 
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of lower courts have considered whether exhaustion should be a requirement, with 
courts divided over the correct approach.169 The wisdom of imposing an exhaustion 
requirement is beyond the scope of this Note. However, exhaustion could certainly 
serve as a safeguard—allowing ATS jurisdiction only when the domestic legal 
system is too illegitimate to provide a remedy.170  
B. The Foreign Policy Dangers of Extending Jurisdiction Have Been Exaggerated 
In Kiobel, the justices also seemed concerned with the foreign policy implications 
of extending jurisdiction.171 Because human rights abuses involve so many political 
undertones, the Court was afraid that extending jurisdiction would interfere with the 
foreign policy agendas of the executive or legislature.172 However, this concern, 
especially when considered in the failed state context, has been overblown. 
First, the atrocities that would be the subject of ATS suits are, by definition, 
universally outlawed and reviled. Sosa clearly eliminated all ATS suits which might 
be brought alleging conduct that is not recognized as a human rights violation.173 
Controversial conduct, if not recognized as a human rights violation by the 
international community’s consensus, would not be eligible under the ATS. No state, 
failed or otherwise, is likely to have an “atrocity-favoring law.”174 Further, the United 
States has an interest in affirming and upholding its commitment to human rights, 
especially the particularly egregious variety to which the ATS is limited.175 As U.S. 
Solicitor General Verrilli articulated to the Court during the Kiobel arguments: the 
United States has “interests in ensuring that our Nation’s foreign relations 
commitments to the rule of law and human rights are not eroded.”176 When 
jurisdiction is limited only to conduct over which there is no dispute of wrongness, 
and the executive branch itself is arguing for increased jurisdiction, foreign policy 
concerns are minimal. 
Second, because failed states are not engaging with the international community 
on a meaningful level, the risk of foreign policy blowback is minimal. As already 
established, failed states are legal entities in theory only—they do not possess the 
institutional integrity or consistency to interact with the international community and 
take on international obligations.177 As such, ATS suits are unlikely to disrupt 
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delicate negotiations between the United States and the failed state. There would be 
no sovereign entity able to object to the exercise of jurisdiction in any coherent way. 
The fact that providing jurisdiction for conduct occurring in functioning states would 
provoke an international disturbance does not justify forbidding jurisdiction where 
the foreign state does not—or cannot—object.178 Additionally, ATS suits involve a 
civil suit brought by a private party. ATS suits do not constitute an official U.S. 
action or judgment about the parties or territory where the suit originated.  
Finally, there is no evidence that expanding the ATS jurisdiction, especially in 
this limited setting, would result in retaliatory legislation or litigation. Although 
Chief Justice Roberts appeared concerned with the possibility of retaliatory civil 
actions against Americans,179 there is no evidence that such actions would be taken. 
In fact, although Filartiga was decided in 1980, the Chief Justice was unable to 
provide a single example of retaliation.180 Likely, no persuasive example exists.181 
Rather, it seems the opposite is true: the international community perceives potential 
jurisdiction under the ATS as admirable—an approach to be adopted.182 Such a view 
is further supported by the fact that the U.S. government argued for a broader 
conception of ATS jurisdiction in Kiobel.183 Finally, because failed states are 
unlikely to possess the capability to coherently object to jurisdiction or engage in 
retaliation, this concern is even more inapplicable. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR ADDRESSING 
THESE VIOLATIONS 
In contrast to the minimal comity and foreign policy concerns that extending 
jurisdiction to failed states would raise, the United States has strong interests in 
providing redress for the egregious human rights violations covered by the ATS. The 
Unites States has a strong, recognized interest in human rights accountability 
worldwide.184 Likewise, victims of gross human rights abuses have a recognized 
right to access remedies185—an interest which has received little attention in this 
debate. Those interests, however, are both relatively abstract. Extending ATS 
jurisdiction to the failed state context would deliver more tangible benefits as well. 
A. Providing Jurisdiction Would Align with U.S. Interests. 
Human rights abuses in failed states are a global externality. As already 
established, failed states are breeding grounds for terrorism and illegal trade.186 
Sudan’s history of supporting terrorist organizations is long, predating South Sudan’s 
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secession.187 The conflict in South Sudan has also resulted in increased elephant 
poaching, illegal gold mining and smuggling, and arms smuggling.188 When the 
political and institutional infrastructure of a state collapses, rogue actors thrive.189 
This fact—the security threat posed by failed states—is often the justification given 
for on-the-ground intervention.190 Certainly, then, allowing victims of human rights 
abuses to bring suit in U.S. courts would be justified, if only as a more cost-effective 
alternative. Failed states also impose significant financial costs on the rest of the 
international community.191 The more the state is in turmoil, and the more its citizens 
are experiencing major human rights abuses, the greater the cost to the rest of the 
world.192 Further, the United States has an interest in developing the failed state 
economically, if only as a market for U.S. goods and services.193 Because 
globalization is tying the world’s markets together, all economic voids impact the 
United States,194 and human rights violations are a major contributor to creating those 
voids.195 Law and order are a prerequisite for economic growth, and it would be wise 
to “extend the rule of law to those luckless places” that “struggle against violence,” 
like failed states.196 
Additionally, the United States has a strong, demonstrated commitment to rule of 
law and human rights. As previously mentioned, the U.S. Solicitor General 
highlighted this interest during the Kiobel arguments.197 In his concurrence, Justice 
Breyer also emphasized this interest.198 Further, the United States has codified its 
intention to “promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and 
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fundamental freedoms throughout the world.”199 For the last forty years, presidential 
administrations have confirmed the United States’ commitment to human rights.200  
Finally, expanding the ATS would increase U.S. soft power. Soft power—the 
United States’ “ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the 
values that underlie them”201—is an integral part of the United States’ status as a 
world power.202 Furthermore, soft power must be cultivated and developed 
intentionally.203 According to Professor Weinberg, “American alien tort litigation 
surely advances America’s moral standing and authority in the world.”204 Providing 
victims of horrific crimes an avenue to air their grievances and achieve justice fits 
naturally with American ideals and is likely to be met with admiration and imitation 
internationally.205 
B. Providing Jurisdiction Would Strengthen Protection of Human Rights  
in Failed States 
Of course, even if the United States has strong interests in deterring human rights 
abuses and providing redress for those that have occurred, extending jurisdiction is 
useless unless it would further those interests. One might object: What good would 
a verdict in favor of the victims do? Even if the hopes of collecting damages are 
small, however, extending jurisdiction is still worthwhile. 
First, expanding the ATS to cover the failed state context would strengthen 
international human rights norms. Merely by existing, the ATS expresses 
condemnation of acts that are particularly egregious.206 Victims in failed states are 
among the most marginalized of all human rights victims.207 Because they have no 
domestic recourse, and likely lack the resources or institutions to organize and gain 
political attention, they are often without a forum to voice their grievances.208 The 
ATS provides a forum. Merely by shedding light on groups that might otherwise 
languish in the shadows, the ATS legitimizes and vindicates the victims.  
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Further, litigation is an effective method for ending human rights abuses. Because 
human rights abuse victims are generally disenfranchised, attempts to gain redress 
through political solutions often go nowhere.209 Consequently, allowing private 
parties, with the aid of nongovernmental organizations, to bring private civil suits 
against abusers have been, comparatively, quite effective.210 First of all, the ATS 
places the power to bring suit in the victim’s hands. Instead of waiting and hoping 
that outside governments will take notice and act to stop the violations, the victims 
are empowered to take action themselves.211 ATS suits expose human rights abusers, 
often serving as a public, legal record that the violation occurred.212 Additionally, 
they challenge the culture of impunity which often exists in failed states, provide 
survivors with a forum for speaking out, deter future abuses,213 and ensure that the 
United States will not give safe haven to human rights abusers.214 At the very least, 
upon entry of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff, the defendant’s freedom to enter the 
United States is severely limited because the defendant’s assets could be seized by a 
court.215  
C. Anatomy of an ATS Suit 
Thus far, this Note has focused on the threshold issue in ATS cases: jurisdiction. 
If the suit cannot be properly brought in U.S. courts, then the inquiry goes no further. 
However, the hurdles for ATS plaintiffs do not end once jurisdiction is established. 
Because an ATS suit, especially one involving foreign parties and conduct 
originating in a failed state, is different from typical domestic tort law suits, one 
might wonder about the mechanics of the action: Who brings the suit? What is the 
cause of action? What kind of remedies might result?216 Although robust answers to 
these questions are far beyond the scope of this Note, providing a brief outline of the 
contours of an ATS suit is helpful. Courts have struggled over these issues, but many 
ATS suits have been successfully litigated regardless.217 
ATS actions originate when a plaintiff decides to bring suit in a U.S. court. 
Although victims of human rights violations often decide to bring suit without 
prompting, international human rights organizations often seek out and work with 
victims—offering advice and resources—to find plaintiffs for ATS suits.218 The ATS 
is solely a jurisdictional statute, so it does not provide a cause of action.219 However, 
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courts have recognized a number of violations of the law of nations that meet Sosa’s 
requirements of universal condemnation and specificity.220 In order to properly 
establish personal jurisdiction, a party will often have to wait to serve the defendant 
until the defendant appears in the United States.221 Because of this, even the threat of 
a suit can constrain the freedom of a potential defendant to travel, resulting in a small 
victory for victims. Successful ATS actions result in monetary damage awards,222 
although the suits create other benefits as well.223 Although satisfying all these 
procedural barriers might be challenging for actions originating in failed states, it can 
be done.224 Extending ATS jurisdiction to include actions originating in failed states 
would not be a futile gesture. 
Take, as the setting for a hypothetical ATS suit, a multinational corporation with 
a presence in a state that has collapsed around the company.225 Should that 
corporation engage in conduct that violates the Sosa requirements—basically the 
erga omnes and jus cogens offenses226—no local authorities would be in a position, 
even if they wanted, to provide a remedy. In that case, under extended ATS 
jurisdiction, nongovernmental organizations could work with victims to bring claims 
in U.S. courts.227 Because of its international presence, serving the company would 
be relatively straightforward, as would obtaining a monetary remedy, should the suit 
be successful.228 Victims would receive compensation and vindication, the company 
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would be penalized for its actions and motivated to stabilize troubled states in which 
it has holdings, and the international human rights framework would be strengthened.  
D. Statutory Reform as an Alternative to Jurisprudential Reform 
Although this Note has focused on the Court’s reasoning in Kiobel and suggested 
a situation where the reasons and concerns for applying a presumption against 
extraterritorial application should be rebutted, the reasons to provide ATS 
jurisdiction in the failed state context are strong enough to justify legislative action. 
After Filartiga, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act, which provides 
a federal cause of action for victims of torture or extrajudicial killings.229 That Act’s 
legislative history demonstrated Congress’s intent to endorse and broaden the 
Filartiga holding.230 In Kiobel’s wake, Congress should once again weigh in, this 
time amending the ATS to exempt actions originating from conduct in failed states 
from the presumption against extraterritorial application. Rather than using the term 
“failed state,” which is subject to various definitions, Congress should focus on the 
inadequacy of domestic remedies. If a state’s political and legal infrastructure is too 
dysfunctional to provide a fair hearing, the United States’ interests in providing a 
forum outweigh the concerns behind the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
 CONCLUSION 
According to many commentators, the Kiobel decision sounded the death knell 
for ATS human rights litigation.231 If that proves to be the case, it would be troubling. 
The United States has strong interests in providing a forum and means of redress for 
foreign victims of egregious human rights abuses. Even if a suit does not directly 
impact the United States, the United States is hardly a disinterested bystander.  
In Kiobel, the Justices raised concerns about sovereignty and foreign policy. The 
analysis in Kiobel was very territorial—premised on the traditional idea that 
nation-states are sovereign actors, each autonomous and self-sufficient. However, 
globalization is rendering that conception of the international order outdated. Even 
if the nation-state is still the predominant entity in the international system, it cannot 
be used to describe all territories. 
This Note has argued that the failed state is one such example. Because failed 
states lack the institutional structure or legitimacy to fulfill traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty, and are too ineffective to coherently engage in foreign policy, the 
primary concerns identified in Kiobel are inapposite. Further, victims in failed states 
are both numerous and very likely to lack legitimate options for redress. Thus, 
reformation of the ATS is needed, and it could be achieved either through the 
judiciary or the legislature. Extending ATS jurisdiction to encompass conduct 
originating in failed states would serve U.S. interests, avoid foreign policy or comity 
complications, and vindicate disenfranchised victims. 
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